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I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY OVERSTATING 
GOODWIN LEASE'S VALUE, INCLUDING IT AS MARITAL 
PROPERTY, AND AWARDING IT TO DEFENDANT• 
As demonstrated in the Brief of Appellant ("Brief"), 
Judge Eves abused his discretion by overstating the value, if 
any, of the Goodwin Lease, by including it among the marital 
assets and by using its inflated value to dramatically distort 
the equitable division of martial property. 
A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Overstating the Value of the Goodwin Lease, 
In his Brief, Defendant/Appellant marshalled the 
evidence to show that Plaintiff/Appellee testified that the 
Goodwin Lease was valued at $244,100. (Brief at 4, 13; R. at 
1025-26.) She later testified that farming the Goodwin property 
was not profitable. (R. at 1181-1183.) 
Clifford Cook, an individual who farmed the Goodwin 
property for 20 years before the Davies, testified that he never 
realized a profit and considered farming it to be an "expensive 
hobby." (R. at 1403.) Judge Eves later observed that based on 
the evidence presented at trial, it appeared as if the Davies' 
farming activities were producing nothing more than tremendous 
expenses every year. (R. at 1190-92.) 
Defendant/Appellant argued that considering the 
property's unprofitability, the Goodwin Lease was essentially 
worthless. (Brief at 12-15; R. at 1182, 1301, 1306, 1403-04.) 
At least one point during the trial, Judge Eves appeared to 
believe the same. (R. at 1190-92.) Furthermore, any future 
income to Defendant/Appellant from farming activities would be 
1 
conditioned on Defendant/Appellant's own hard labor--which does 
not qualify as a marital asset. (Brief at 14.) See Erickson v. 
Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P.2d 1314, 1323 (Utah App. 1990) (noting 
that future income conditioned on personal services is not a 
marital interest). 
The trial court received no expert testimony or 
appraisals regarding the value of the land subject to the Goodwin 
Lease. On its face, the Goodwin Lease covers 277 acres of 
property. (R. at 242DY.)1 
Judge Eves invented his own formula for the purpose of 
valuing the Goodwin Lease: "$3,000 per year times 30 years, which 
equal a total current value of $90,000." (Brief at 4, 11; R. at 
699.) Such formula is not supported by the record on appeal, is 
not consistent with Utah law and is not within the trial court's 
discretion. (Brief at 10-15.) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, in violation of Rule 11, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, referenced an accounting text and formula 
not used at trial in an effort to justify Judge Eves' valuation. 
Such accounting text and formula should be stricken, pursuant to 
the Court's Order dated October 11, 1996, because they are not 
part of the record on appeal and were clearly not used by Judge 
Eves in reaching his $90,000 valuation of the Goodwin Lease. (R. 
at 699.) Even when applying her accounting formula, 
Plaintiff/Appellee incorporates Judge Eves' error of using 3 0 
1
 It is noteworthy that references in the 
Plaintiff/Appellee's Brief asserting that the Goodwin Lease 
covered a larger tract of land were not supported by the record 
and were therefore stricken pursuant to an Order by this Court on 
October 10, 1996. 
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years as the remaining term on the Goodwin Lease. (Brief at 11 
n.4. ) 
As indicated in the Brief, Judge Eves abused his 
discretion with regards to the Goodwin Farm in several respects, 
including the following: (1) by overvaluing the Goodwin Lease; 
(2) by using a faulty formula; (3) by not discounting the amount 
to its present value; (4) by not including sufficiently detailed 
financial findings as required by Utah law; (5) by not obtaining 
an expert appraisal on the property; (6) by not considering the 
Lease's extensive restrictions and invalidations; (7) by placing 
a value on Defendant/Appellant's future personal services; and 
(8) by not properly weighing the testimony from all relevant 
witnesses, including Plaintiff/Appellee, that farming operations 
on the Goodwin Farm had proven unprofitable and amounted to 
nothing more than an "expensive hobby." (Brief at 9-15.) 
At two points in the trial, in fact, Judge Eves 
indicated that he agreed that farming the Goodwin property 
constituted an "expensive hobby." (R. at 1402-1404.) At one 
point, Judge Eves stated: 
I guess the point that I am making is this. 
If we look at these figures, it looks to me 
like your desire to farm is an expensive 
hobby that isn't producing any income. What 
it does is produce tremendous expenses every 
year, and you're slowly but surely digging 
yourself a big hole. And if that's the 
situation, Craig may be in the same 
circumstance, and, in fact, his farming 
operation may not have any value either. 
That's the -- that's the -- what's to be 
drawn from these figures that you're 
presenting is that your losing money every 
year from your farming operations. So that's 
why I asked. 
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(Emphasis added.) (R. at 1190-92.) Judge Eves noted that 
Plaintiff/Appellee's figures showed that the parties were losing 
money every year on their farming activities. Plaintiff/Appellee 
did not present other figures to contradict such conclusion. 
Defendant/Appellant maintains in this appeal that Judge Eves 
abused his discretion by disregarding such figures and inventing 
his own formula instead. 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Including 
the Goodwin Lease as Marital Property, 
In addition to grossly overvaluing the Goodwin Lease, 
Defendant/Appellant maintains that Judge Eves abused his 
discretion through his inconsistent application of the "sweat 
equity" doctrine. Plaintiff/Appellee testified that she 
contributed a significant amount of time and effort to the 
maintenance, repairs and upkeep of both the Cow Hollow and 
Goodwin properties. (R. at 907-16, 973-84.) Judge Eves found 
that Plaintiff/Appellee's labors, maintenance and repairs on Cow 
Hollow were merely consistent with the "family use of the 
property," (Brief at 9; R. at 688-89), while her labors on the 
Goodwin Farm constituted "sweat equity" which converted the 
Goodwin Lease to a marital asset. (Brief at 8-9; R. at 1559.) 
While recognizing that Utah law provides a "sweat 
equity" exception for donee property, Defendant/Appellant 
maintains that Judge Eves' position on the Goodwin Lease is 
arbitrary, inconsistent and in contradiction of his position on 
the Cow Hollow property. 
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C. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Awarding 
Defendant/Appellant the Majority of the Marital 
Debt Offset Against the Overvalued Goodwin Lease» 
By overvaluing the Goodwin Lease and classifying it as 
a marital asset awarded to Defendant/Appellant, Judge Eves has 
grossly distorted the fair and equitable distribution of the 
marital property. Plaintiff/Appellee argues in her brief that 
Utah law does not require a precisely equal division of property. 
While this may be true, the general rule is that marital property 
should be shared equally between the parties, unless the trial 
court memorializes adequate findings of unusual circumstances. 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1022 (Utah App. 1990). (Brief at 9-11.) 
Judge Eves, rather than memorializing unusual findings which 
justified the grossly disparate distribution of debts and assets 
absent the inflated value of the Goodwin Lease, found that "the 
division of debt appears appropriate" "in view of the fact that 
Defendant received a higher value of the marital property." (R. 
at 806-807.) 
The "higher value of marital property" awarded to 
Defendant/Appellant consists primarily of the disputed Goodwin 
Lease--since the value of the Lease comprised over 61 percent2 
of the marital property awarded to Defendant/Appellant. (R. at 
801-02.) Were it not for the Judge Eves' overvaluation of the 
Goodwin Lease, Plaintiff/Appellee likely would have been awarded 
substantially more of the marital debt and Defendant/Appellant 
2
 Defendant/Appellant was awarded $147,069 in marital 
property. (R. at 801-02). The trial court valued the Goodwin 
Lease at $90,000. (R. at 799-00). $90,000 divided by $147,069 
equals 61 percent. 
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would likely have been awarded more of the "genuine" marital 
assets. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPUTING MORE 
INCOME TO DEFENDANT/APPELLANT THAN HE EARNED IN FOUR 
YEARS PRECEDING THE DIVORCE. 
Judge Eves abuse his discretion by imputing a monthly 
income to Defendant/Appellant that was substantially higher than 
he earned in the four years immediately preceding the divorce 
decree. (R. at 751.) While reviewing the couples' joint tax 
information from 1991 through 1994, Plaintiff/Appellee testified 
that Defendant/Appellant earned substantially less than $1,500 
per month. (Brief at 15-17/ R. at 1058-63.) Judge Eves' 
imputation of income was not in accordance with Utah law. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (7) (a) (Supp. 1995). (Brief at 15.) 
In her brief, Plaintiff/Appellee argues that Judge 
Eves' imputation was appropriate because the record supported the 
conclusion that Defendant/Appellant was earning more than $2,540 
per month. However, Plaintiff/Appellee completely disregarded or 
misunderstood the difference between gross income and net income. 
Plaintiff/Appellee's argument completely ignored the "tremendous 
expenses involve in the farming operations that caused the 
parties to lose money every year. (R. at 1191.) 
For instance, a farmer expends labor, the cost of the 
seed, water, ground, equipment, etc. in order to grow hay. If he 
then feeds that hay to his animals, the farmer does not realize 
income from his hay. Rather, a farmer recognizes "expenses" of 
his farm operations. Testimony at trial proved that the 
"expenses" of the Goodwin farm operations typically exceeded its 
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revenues. (R. at 1191.) Even Judge Eves acknowledged this fact. 
(R. at 1190-92.) 
While ignoring or misunderstanding this concept, 
Plaintiff/Appellee's brief lists every aspect of 
Defendant/Appellant's farming operation as "income," without any 
consideration for the correlating expenses. Thus, 
Plaintiff/Appellee's conclusion that Defendant/Appellant was 
earning in excess of $2,540 per month is false, misleading, 
without merit and therefore should be stricken. If Judge Eves' 
ruling is allowed to stand, then trial judge's in future Utah 
divorce actions will be permitted to impute whatever income a 
disgruntled spouse feels that her ex-husband is capable of 
earning. Such a policy is plainly wrong and therefore should be 
avoided. 
Most individuals in this state could earn more money by 
working harder through overtime, second jobs, career changes, 
etc. In fact, many public servants could earn a lot more income 
if they were to work in the private sector. Some elementary 
school teachers may even earn more money if they left teaching 
and became garbage collectors. However, public policy dictates 
that we do not require parties in divorce to leave their 
professions of choice and find higher paying jobs. Craig Davie 
chose to be a farmer. It may be possible that he could have 
earned more money in another profession--but such is not the 
issue. If every farmer in this country were to give up farming 
to find other work, what kind of society would remain? 
Judge Eves' finding that Defendant/Appellant was 
"capable" of earning more than the evidence revealed at trial was 
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an abuse of discretion, and his subsequent imputation of a $1,500 
monthly income for the purpose of calculating child support was 
clearly erroneous.3 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPROPERLY 
RESTRICTING DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S VISITATION RIGHTS. 
It is amusing how much emphasis Plaintiff/Appellee's 
counsel places on Defendant/Appellant's alleged fornication or 
adultery when the record clearly reflects Plaintiff/Appellee's 
own out-of-wedlock sexual relationship with her "friend," Glade. 
(R. at 1422-23.) 
Judge Eves, however, made no findings or conclusions 
regarding either party's morals. Instead, Judge Eves made an 
explicit finding that both "Sheb and Seth have expressed 
discomfort with visiting overnight when their father is 
entertaining Ms. McFall overnight." (R. at 685-86, 749-50.) 
Plaintiff/Appellee has not disputed the fact that the record does 
not support such a finding. (Brief at 17-19.) Due to the lack 
of sufficiency of evidence, such finding should be set aside 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) . 
IV. DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S BRIEF AND APPEAL ARE IN 
COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
In her brief, Plaintiff/Appellee makes several attacks 
concerning the adequacy of Defendant/Appellant's Brief and the 
effectiveness of this appeal, all of which are without merit.4 
3
 It is noteworthy that any and all references in 
Plaintiff/Appellee's Brief to Defendant/Appellant's post-divorce 
income were ordered stricken by this Court in an Order dated 
October 10, 1996. 
4
 It is noteworthy that Plaintiff/Appellee's motion of 
suggestion of mootness was denied by this Court in an Order dated 
October 10, 1996. 
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Defendant/Appellant's appeal and Brief are in full compliance 
with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
A. Defendant/Appellant' a Brief Complies With The 
Requirement Of Marshalling The Evidence. 
Defendant/Appellant has adequately met his requirement 
to marshall the evidence through his statement of the case and 
his argument with numerous cites to the record on appeal. 
Specifically, Defendant/Appellant marshalled the evidence for 
each issue on appeal: (1) the valuation of the Goodwin Lease as a 
marital asset; (2) the court's imputing a $1500 monthly income to 
Defendant/Appellant for the purpose of determining child support; 
and (3) the restrictions placed on Defendant/Appellant's 
overnight visitations with his sons. 
1. Evidence Regarding the Goodwin Lease Was 
Adequately Marshalled. 
First, with regard to the valuation of the Goodwin 
Lease as a marital asset, Plaintiff/Appellant's Brief marshalled 
the following evidence: (1) the terms and restrictions of the 
Goodwin Lease, (Brief at 3-4; R. at 292DY-EC); (2) 
Plaintiff/Appellee's testimony regarding the terms and value of 
the Goodwin Lease, (Brief at 3-4, 11; R. at 1110-15, 1024-26); 
(3) Judge Eves' finding regarding the labors, maintenance and 
repairs of Plaintiff/Appellee constituting sweat equity, (Brief 
at 4, 8; R. at 801, 1559); (4) Clifford Cook's testimony 
regarding the unprofitability of the Goodwin property, (Brief at 
3; R. at 1403-04); (5) Judge Eves' formula and calculation for 
valuation of the Lease, (Brief at 4, 11 n.4; R. at 699); (6) 
Plaintiff's labors, repairs and maintenance on Cow Hollow, (Brief 
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at 8-10; R. at 688-89); (7) Judge Eves' division of marital debts 
and assets, (Brief at 4-5; R. at 787, 803, 1313.) 
Defendant/Appellant's argument centered around the 
valuation formula and the finding that Plaintiff's labors on Cow 
Hollow were consistent with the family use on the property, while 
her labors on Goodwin converted the property to a marital asset. 
Utah courts require only that an appellant marshall relevant 
evidence, which plaintiff/Appellant has done. Slatterv v. Covey & 
Co.. Inc., 857 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah App. 1993). Furthermore, Utah 
courts do not require an appellant to marshall evidence in 
situations where, as in the instant case, the court's findings 
are insufficiently detailed. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 
638 (Utah App. 1995). Lastly, to the extent that an appellant 
fails to adequately marshall the evidence in her first brief, she 
can do so in her reply brief. State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 
561 (Utah App. 1991). 
In short, the record does not even contain a scintilla 
of competent evidence to support Judge Eves' formula for valuing 
the Goodwin Lease. The record does contain an extensive account 
of Plaintiff/Appellant's considerable labors on the Goodwin farm, 
(R. at 910-18, 968-83, 1111-41, 1173-76), but Judge Eves made no 
findings or conclusions which justify the disparity of treatment 
between the "family use" labors on the Cow Hollow property and 
the labors Plaintiff/Appellant performed on the Goodwin (R. at 
1080-94.) Defendant/Appellant maintains that Plaintiff/ 
Appellee's labors on Goodwin were also consistent with the 
"family use" of the property. (Brief at 7-9.) Thus, Judge Eves' 
conclusions of law regarding the Goodwin Farm are incorrect and 
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should be overturned since such conclusions are accorded no 
particular deference on appeal. Slatterv v. Covey & Co., Inc., 
857 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Evidence Regarding Defendant/Appellant's 
Income Was Adequately Marshalled. 
Second, with respect to the court's imputing a $1500 
monthly income to Defendant/Appellant for the purpose of 
determining child support, Defendant/Appellant marshalled the 
evidence regarding Plaintiff/Appellee's testimony with respect to 
his income during the marriage. (Brief at 5, 15-16; R. at 752, 
1059-63. ) 
As was the case with the formula used in valuing the 
Goodwin Lease, Defendant/Appellant's requirement to marshall the 
evidence supporting Mr. Davie's imputation of income was not an 
overly burdensome task because the record contains absolutely no 
support for such a finding. See Slatterv, 857 P.2d at 246 
(requiring only the marshalling of relevant evidence). Both the 
valuation of the Goodwin Lease and the imputation of income to 
Mr. Davie involve mathematical numbers that are strictly 
traceable to specific portions of the record on appeal. 
Defendant/Appellant provided the Court with specific cites to 
such figures, formulas and calculations in his Brief and 
accordingly satisfied the marshalling of the evidence 
requirement. 
Plaintiff/Appellee argues in her brief that, in her 
opinion, Defendant/Appellant is capable of earning $1500 per 
month--even though he never did during their marriage. (R. at 
1063.) It is interesting that Plaintiff/Appellee spends a 
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considerable amount of time at trial testifying that her husband 
was a lousy and lazy farmer, but seems to believe that he can 
almost double his income overnight after the divorce--and after 
he lost the Kirk/13 Mile farm to her in the divorce. 
Judge Eves abused his discretion by relying on 
Plaintiff/Appellee's opinion testimony that her ex-husband was 
capable of earning $1500 per month. (R. at 1059-63.) Outside of 
Plaintiff/Appellee's bald assertion, there was no other evidence 
introduced at trial or considered by Judge Eves which indicated 
that Defendant/Appellant ever earned $1,500 per month. 
Plaintiff/Appellee readily admitted during cross-examination that 
her $1,500 figure was merely her estimation and imputation of 
what she felt that he was "capable" of earning. (R. at 1059-60.) 
Judge Eves adopted Plaintiff/Appellee's $1,500 monthly income 
figure into his findings of fact and conclusions of law without 
any measure of scrutiny. (R. at 295-96, 751.) To the extent 
that Judge Eves relied on Plaintiff/Appellee's bald assertion 
regarding ex-husband's income capabilities to impute a specific 
income to Mr. Davie, he abused his discretion. Since there is no 
other evidence in the record on appeal to justify a $1,500 
monthly income for Defendant/Appellant, this Court should 
overturn the trial court's findings as being clearly erroneous. 
3. Appellant Appropriately Marshalled Evidence 
Regarding Visitation Restrictions, 
Third, with respect to the trial court's restrictions 
on Defendant/Appellant's overnight visitations with his sons, 
Defendant/Appellant appropriately marshalled the relevant 
evidence. (Brief at 5, 17-19; R. at 685, 782-83, 1415-17, 1495, 
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1502.) Due to Judge Eves specific findings that the boys "have 
expressed discomfort with visiting overnight," (R. at 685), the 
only relevant evidence necessary to challenge such a finding is 
the testimony of the boys. Defendant/Appellant's Brief showed 
that neither Sheb or Seth ever made any such statement. Judge 
Eves abused his discretion by mischaracterizing their testimony 
in attempt to justify his denying Mr. Davie the right to 
reasonable visitation rights with his teenage sons. Thus, Judge 
Eves' finding that the boys expressed discomfort with overnight 
visitation is against the clear weight of evidence making such a 
finding clearly erroneous. 
B. Defendant/Appellant's Notice of Appeal Is In 
Compliance With The Utah Rules Of Appellate 
Procedure 
Plaintiff/Appellee argues in her brief that this appeal 
must be dismissed because Defendant/Appellant failed to reference 
the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in his 
Notice of Appeal. Such argument is completely without merit and 
is unsupported with any case law. 
Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides 
that appeals may be taken "from all final judgments and orders." 
The Rules do not require an appellant to appeal from specific 
findings or conclusions. See Rule 3(d), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure; Form 1, Notice of Appeal, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Several Utah cases show that a divorce decree is the 
very type of "final judgment or order" referred to in Rule 3. 
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976) (holding that 
an appeal had to be taken within one month of the divorce decree, 
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even though such decree did not become a final judgment until 
three months after its entry). 
In fact, there are numerous reported Utah cases in 
which appeal is taken on underlying issues from the decree of 
divorce. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App. 1992); 
Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 975-76 (Utah App. 1992); Noble v. 
Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Utah 1988); Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 
862, 863 (Utah 1984) . 
Furthermore, when appealing from an entire final 
judgment, it is not necessary to specify each and every order and 
detail from which the appellant seeks review. Scudder v. 
Kennecott Copper Corp., 886 P.2d 48 (Utah 1994). Hence, 
Defendant/Appellant's Notice of Appeal was in full compliance 
with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
C, The "Benefits of the Judgment" Argument Raised in 
Brief of Appellee Is Not Applicable In A Divorce 
Context. 
Contrary to Plaintiff/Appellant's brief, the "benefits 
of the judgment" argument does not apply in a divorce context. 
Applying the rule in a divorce context would prove disastrous and 
against public policy because parties would be forced to abandon 
their personal property in order to appeal a divorce decree. 
There are no reported cases in Utah in which a court 
has applied the so-called "benefits of the judgment" rule to a 
divorce case. Were such a rule to be applied in a divorce 
context, most if not all parties to a divorce would be precluded 
from appealing. 
Furthermore, Defendant/Appellant maintains that he 
received no "benefit" from the divorce decree. He was awarded a 
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substantially high portion of the joint marital debt, and a gift 
lease from his mother was the only significant marital asset 
awarded to him. The "benefits" listed in Plaintiff/Appellee's 
brief are nothing more than income from farm property owned by 
Mr. Davie--to argue that Mr. Davie must refrain from his farming 
occupation pending the outcome of this appeal is utter nonsense. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce. 
DATED this ^ day of November, 1996. 
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